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Abstract: 
It is undisputed that rules are necessary to cope with the risks of failing financial institutions 
in the financial sector. These rules link the risk profile of a financial institution to the quanti-
tative and qualitative properties of its capital. In the real economy the discussion proceeds 
from the opposite direction, putting the necessity of a minimal capital and its regulation into 
question. This essay shows however, that even for the real economy, rules are in place which 
require the board of a company to adjust the risk profile to the level and structure of the com-
pany’s equity and vice versa. The relationship between risk-bearing ability and equity leads to 
a set of principles and rules on how to determine the correct amount of equity. The essay de-
scribes these rules and their procedural enforcement based on company and accounting law 
rules.  
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1. Equity  
1.1 Equity as risk reserve 
 
Equity is the difference-amount between the debts and the assets of the company. If the com-
pany were to sell all assets and pay back all liabilities, the remaining value1 would belong to 
the shareholders. The function of equity is thus to provide33 a buffer or a reserve to cope with 
corporate risks; essentially safeguarding creditors’ claims2. Therefore, the term ‘risk reserve’3 
is an appropriate and preferable description of the function of equity. Equity is the amount 
which the company should not distribute to the shareholders in view of the risk that the claims 
of creditors are not safeguarded.4 The primary risk that can be controlled by equity is the risk 
of asset reduction. The reduction of assets and increase of liabilities can result for numerous 
reasons: cash-drain, new liabilities and the revaluation of assets and liabilities. The revalua-
tion of assets can become necessary to compensate for their aging (and corresponding loss of 
value),5 a sudden loss in value due to a damage or destruction of the asset; bankruptcy or 
bankruptcy-risk of creditors; or changed market conditions. 
 
                                                 
1 Stephen A. Ross, Randolph Westerfield, Bradford D. Jordan, Fundamentals of Corporate Finance, 9th edn. 
(New York, McGraw-Hill/Irwin 2010) at p. 23. Due to this systematic risk investors in shares require a return 
equivalent to the risk free rate with an additional premium, see Glen Arnold, Handbook of Corporate Finance, A 
business companion to financial markets, decisions and techniques, 2nd edn. (New York, Prentice Hall 2010) at 
pp. 246 et seq. 
2 Jonathan Rickford (ed.), ‘Reforming Capital, Report of the Interdisciplinary Group on Capital Maintenance’, 
15 EBLR (2004) at p. 928 [Rickford Report]; also Wolfgang Schön, ‘The Future of Legal Capital’, 5 EBOR 
(2004) pp. 429 et seq at p. 440; Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC Preamble: ‘provisions should be adopted 
for maintaining the capital, which constitutes the creditors’ security’. 
3 Lukas Handschin, ‘Eigenkapital als Risikoreserve’, in Peter V. Kunz, Dorothea Herren and Thomas Cottier 
(eds.), Wirtschaftsrecht in Theorie und Praxis, Festschrift für Roland von Büren (Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn 
2009) at pp. 69 et seq. 
4 John Armour, ‘Legal Capital: An Outdated Concept?’, 7 EBOR (2006) at p. 10: ‘there may clearly be benefits 
to imposing dividend constrains based on net asset values’, i.e. on real equity; Rickfolrd Report (fn. 2) at p. 44: 
‘in what conditions is it legitimate, in the cause of creditor protection, to restrict a company’s freedom to pay a 
return to its shareholders?’. Also see European Court of Justice [ECJ], Case 212/97 Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs-og 
Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] 2 CMLR 551, at pp. 586 et seq. 
5 ‘Depreciation is the systematic allocation of the depreciable amount of an asset over its useful life.’ (IAS 16.6, 
38.8). ‘An entity shall assess at each reporting date whether there is any indication that an asset may be impaired. 
If any such indication exists, the entity shall estimate the recoverable amount of the asset.’ (IAS 36.9). ‘Depreci-
ation is a systematic and rational process of distributing the cost of tangible assets over the life of assets.’ (US 
GAAP Accounting Research Bulletin [ARB] No. 43, chapter 9C para. 5). 
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1.2 Real equity and nominal equity 
Assets and liabilities always have two values: a book value and a real value. The real value of 
assets and liabilities may deviate from their book value due to accounting rules; due to chang-
es which lead to a reassessment of the company’s assets; or because the company has made a 
mistake when assessing the value of the said asset.6 The equity which is derived from book 
values can be called the nominal equity. It can be directly taken from the balance sheet and 
consists of the statutory or legal capital, the free, accounting and legal reserves and accrued 
profits. The nominal equity is the sum resulting from the deduction of the nominal value of 
the liabilities from the nominal value of the assets of a company.7 Similarly, the equity which 
is derived from real values can be called the real equity. Consequently, the real equity is the 
sum resulting from the deduction of the real value of the liabilities from the real value of the 
assets of a company. 
If we relate these definitions to the function of equity as a reserve to account for the compa-
ny’s financial risks, it is apparent that as much as liabilities and risks are real, not nominal, the 
relevant figure must be the real equity, not the nominal equity. Therefore, to define the equity 
related to the risk bearing ability of a company we have to refer to the real value of assets and 
liabilities, not to their book value.8 
1.2.1 Overvalued assets and their impact on equity 
6 Ross, Westerfield, Jordan (fn. 1) at pp. 23 et seq. 
7 See also Armour (fn.4) at p. 10: ‘there may clearly be benefits to imposing dividend constrains based on net 
asset values’, i.e. on real equity. 
8 Cf. Rickford Report (fn. 2) at p. 943: the Rickford Report questions the concept of equity in principle, based on 
the (correct) assessment that nominal equity alone cannot safeguard the rights of creditors. 
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If the book value of the assets exceeds the real value, the real equity is reduced. In these situa-
tions the real equity is smaller than the nominal equity. If the nominal equity is smaller than 
the difference between the real value of the liabilities and the real value of the assets of a 
company, the real equity is no longer sufficient to cover the liabilities. 
 
As a consequence the nominal equity should be determined in such a way that the real equity 
remains sufficient to cover liabilities and risks. The gap between nominal and real equity de-
pends on the reliability of the valuation of assets and liabilities; that is precisely on the risk 
that assets are valued to high and liabilities to low. There is a correlation between the valua-
tion risk and equity; the larger the risk of false valuations (overvaluation in case of assets; 
undervaluation in case of liabilities), the more nominal equity is needed to close the gap be-
tween the nominal equity and the real equity. 
 
One of the functions of nominal equity is thus to close this gap. It is imperative that the nomi-
nal equity is sufficient to cover the liabilities of the company, even if it turns out that the val-
uation of assets and liabilities was too high or too low, respectively. Where the reliability of 
the asset valuation is questionable, the nominal equity must exceed the (assumed) real equity 
to cover the revaluation risk.  
 
1.2.2 Hidden reserves and revaluation reserves (valuation surplus) and their 
impact on equity 
 
In part, these (undervaluation-) risks are covered by accounting rules. In civil law accounting 
and to a certain extent in US GAAP the risk of asset revaluation is reduced by valuation rules 
which focus on prudence, rather than on a true and fair valuation. For instance, according to 
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the rules of the commercial codes of most civil law countries and under US GAAP9 (also as 
an option in IFRS10), fixed assets can only be valued at their production or purchase value 
after the necessary depreciations have been made. Value increases of fixed assets after the 
purchase are, as a rule, not possible. If assets valued at production or purchase value actually 
increase in value over subsequent years (as could be the case with real estate for example) the 
real value of the asset will be higher than its book value. This difference in amount (spread) 
are ‘hidden reserves’. Hidden reserves reduce the (nominal) amount of assets, consequently 
lessening the risk of value reductions. In the legal doctrine of civil law countries hidden re-
serves are justified as a possibility to reduce the revaluation risk.11 
 
If a company holds assets with a book value above the real value (overvalued assets) and oth-
er assets with a real value which is higher than the book value (hidden reserves), hidden re-
serves can compensate for overvalued assets. This shows that hidden reserves reduce the ef-
fect of overvalued assets; they are – in fact – equity.12 
 
True and fair accounting rules make more use of the full valuation potential of assets and al-
low a revaluation of assets, where an asset has increased in value. Some accounting rules de-
mand that the difference between the initial and the new value of the asset is not booked as 
profit, but instead must be allocated to a specific revaluation reserve or surplus. This is re-
                                                 
9 Under US GAAP the upward revaluation of assets generally is not allowed. FAS 121.11; U.S. GAAP Codifica-
tion of Accounting Standards [ASC] 360 <http://accountinginfo.com/financial-accounting-standards/asc-
codification-index.htm>. 
10 IFRS 16.29; IFRS 30. 
11 Peter Böckli, Schweizer Aktienrecht, 4th edn. (Zürich, Basel, Geneva, Schulthess 2009) at p. 905; Frank Vi-
scher, Fritz Rapp, Zur Neugestaltung des Schweizerischen Aktienrechts (Bern, Staempfli 1972) at pp. 30 et seq. 
12 Hidden reserves are resources not listed on a balance sheet, such as land or a building shown at a value less 
than its market value. This valuation difference is a hidden element of a company’s equity. Lukas Handschin, 
‘Corporate Risks, Risk Bearing Ability and Equity’, 22 EBLR (2011) at p. 205. 
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quired by the IFRS and partly under US GAAP for certain assets, for example: property, plant 
and equipment,13 intangible assets,14 investment property,15 available for sale securities16.17  
As a result, the (hidden) equity (of civil law accounting), arising from the undervalued asset, 
is made transparent (by true and fair accounting rules) by increasing both the value of the as-
set and the (nominal) equity (revaluation surplus) in order to cover the valuation risk. Revalu-
ation reserves are accounting reserves designed to cover the revaluation risk of an asset. These 
rules specify and confirm the general principle that valuation risks have to be covered by in-
creased equity.18 
1.3 Equity and asset revaluation risks 
True and fair accounting valuations have increased the vulnerability of the valuation of assets. 
This is the case as in many situations they allow the value of an asset to be based on capital-
13 ‘If an asset's carrying amount is increased as a result of a revaluation, the increase shall be credited directly to 
equity under the heading of revaluation surplus. However, the increase shall be recognized in profit or loss to the 
extent that it reverses a revaluation decrease of the same asset previously recognized in profit or loss.’ (IAS 
16.39). 
14 ‘If an intangible asset’s carrying amount is increased as a result of a revaluation, the increase shall be credited 
directly to equity under the heading of revaluation surplus. However, the increase shall be recognized in profit or 
loss to the extent that it reverses a revaluation decrease of the same asset previously recognized in profit or loss.’ 
(IAS 38.85). Under US GAAP ‘reversal’ of impairment is generally not allowed (for goodwill ASC 350-20-35-
13; for other intangible assets ASC 350-30-35-14, 350-30-35-20). 
15 ‘[A]ny remaining part of the increase is credited directly to equity in revaluation surplus.’ (IAS 40.62). Under 
US GAAP impairment of ‘long-lived assets held for sale’ are not ‘reversed’ when there is a subsequent increase 
in value (ASC 360). 
16 ‘Investments not classified as trading securities (nor as held-to maturity securities) shall be classified as avail-
able-for-sale securities.’ (FAS 115.12b). ’Unrealized holding gains and losses for available-for-sale securities 
(including those classified as current assets) shall be excluded from earnings and reported in other comprehen-
sive income until realized except as indicated in the following sentence. All or a portion of the unrealized hold-
ing gain and loss of an available-for sale security that is designated as being hedged in a fair value hedge shall be 
recognized in earnings during the period of the hedge, pursuant to paragraph 22 of Statement 133. Paragraph 36 
of FASB Statement No. 109, Accounting for Income Taxes, provides guidance on reporting the tax effects of 
unrealized holding gains and losses reported in other comprehensive income.’ (FAS 115.13): under the US 
GAAP changes in fair value of trading securities are recognized in earnings, those available for sale securities 
are recognized for comprehensive income, but earnings and changes in fair value for held to maturity securities 
are not recognized (ASC 320). 
17 Also see Fourth Company Law Directive, Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC, Art. 33 (2): if a Member 
State deviates form the general valuation principle at purchase or production price set forth in Art. 32, revalua-
tion reserves for the value superseding the purchase or production price ‘must be entered in the revaluation re-
serve under “Liabilities”.’ 
18 Handschin (fn. 12) at p. 200 et seq. 
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ized income value or future cash flows and not on the asset’s substance value or production 
cost. True and fair rules assess the value of an asset by looking into the future, in particular by 
estimating the future income the asset can generate. It is self-evident that the risk of valuation 
errors is higher, when basing the valuation on future expectations, rather than on established 
figures of the past such as production costs etc. Further, true and fair valuated assets are more 
vulnerable to changed conditions, when prospects for the future take a downwards turn, re-
quiring a reassessment of the profit and cash flow potentials. In fact, an insignificant worsen-
ing of these future potentials can lead to a considerable revaluation of the asset, and conse-
quently, to losses. In a time of crisis not only is the positive future potential eliminated from 
the valuation, but also pessimistic future prospects have to be included. This results in a dou-
ble correction of the values and, therefore, leads to a consolidation of the correction effect. 
 
A primary purpose of equity is to control valuation errors and changes in valuation. Some 
valuation risks are covered by accounting rules (hidden reserves, valuation surplus19). Others 
have to be covered by additional equity. As a first intermediate result we may conclude that 
equity is a valuation reserve. Based on this principle, financial market regulations have set up 
rules which link the necessary equity-backing to the valuation risk of the asset.20 
1.4 Equity and Liquidity risks 
 
A second company risk is the liquidity risk, meaning, that the company is unable to balance 
cash income and cash expenses. The larger the gap between liquidity income and liquidity 
expenses, the greater the necessity for the company to be able to make use of additional li-
quidity. Essentially, the liquidity risk arises out of unsynchronized due dates of claims and 
                                                 
19 Supra 1.2.2. 
20 See infra 2.3. 
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debts.21 The liquidity risk is the risk that for the satisfaction of a certain obligation the there-
fore needed asset is not at hand. In such a case the needed asset must be replaced by the liqui-
dation of held assets or by an increase in debt.22 
 
In precise terms, the liquidity risk is the risk of a negative free cash flow. If a company has a 
negative free cash flow it has neither the operative potential nor the assets to catch up the out-
flow of funds through operative and investive (or rather divestive) cash flows, for example by 
selling fixed assets. In this situation the company depends on financing. A company with high 
equity in relation to the risk profile can realize this financing by itself; a company with low 
equity does not have this possibility. If no additional funds can be made available from the 
shareholders (not required by most legislations23), the potential to provide for new liquidity 
depends entirely on the company’s ability to increase debt. The ability of the company to in-
crease debt depends on the structure and amount of pre-existing debt and assets24. If the asset 
structure is such, that it can generate liquidity easily, for example if the assets are cash itself 
or can be used as a collateral, the equity which is needed is different from the situation where 
assets cannot be converted to cash easily, for example activated research costs or any other 
assets without a specific market value. 
 
To determine the necessary equity related to the liquidity risk of the company, the company 
first has to determine the size of the gap, or potential gap, between cash income and cash ex-
penses. Second, it must assess the quality of the assets to determine their liquidity. If, for ex-
                                                 
21 Ross, Westerfield, Jordan (fn. 1) at p. 22. 
22 Ross, Westerfield, Jordan (fn. 1) at p. 22: ‘Liquidity refers to the speed and ease with which an asset can be 
converted to cash.’ ‘Any asset can be converted to cash quickly if we cut the price enough. A highly liquid asset 
is therefore one that can be quickly sold without significant loss of value. An illiquid asset is one that cannot be 
quickly converted to cash without a substantial price reduction.’ 
23 E.g. Switzerland: Swiss Code of Obligations [Obligationenrecht, OR] Arts. 620 (2) and 680 (1); Germany: 
German Stock Companies Act [Aktiengesetz, AktG] §55 (only possible in the case of shares with restricted 
transferability). United Kingdom: Companies Act 2006 Section 561 (1) (a). Shareholders have a right but usually 
no duty to fund additional equity. 
24 Handschin (fn. 12) at pp. 193 et seq. with numerical examples. 
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ample, a specific liquidity risk of 1,000 is covered by assets, which are cash itself, then the 
equity could be 1,000 as well. If on the other hand the liquidity risk of 1,000 is covered by 
assets which can be used as collateral but only up to 50 per cent of their value, the equity to 
control this liquidity risk would have to be 2,000. 
1.5 Equity as a reference figure for (the overall financial) risk bearing ability 
 
In the economic literature, financial corporate risks are usually defined by a reason (external, 
operational, strategic) and not so much based on their implications for the balance sheets and 
of the amount of equity.25 This does not change the fact that there is a direct link between 
equity and corporate risks. All corporate risks can be specified as either a valuations risk or a 
liquidity/outflow of cash risk. For example the reputation risk can only create a problem be-
cause it leads to a decrease in customers, and therefore, a decrease in incoming cash and sub-
sequently to additional liquidity risks. The risk that the company is threatened by a lawsuit 
bears the risk, that the liabilities will have to be increased; and the risk that a planned technol-
ogy does not work leads to the risk that activated research costs will have to be impaired. 
 
The more questionable the valuations of assets and debts, the higher the valuation risks are, 
and the larger the equity should be. A company, whose assets consist of activated research 
costs, or, a company which takes risks which may lead to unexpected debts, needs more equi-
ty than a company which does not take any risks and whose assets consist of stable govern-
ment bonds. So we can conclude that equity is the risk reserve of a company. It also follows 
that the universal applicability of equity as a reference figure for the overall financial risk 
                                                 
25 Arnold (fn. 1) at pp. 544 et seq.; Ross, Westerfield, Jordan (fn. 1) at pp. 401 et seq. 
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bearing ability shows the superior function of equity in corporate law.26 This general principle 
is true in both the financial and the non-financial sectors. 
2. Rules on equity in the financial sector 
2.1 Substantive rules (equity requirements) 
Financial market rules regarding the necessary equity-backing regulate respective equity re-
quirements and define specific asset categories based on their inherent revaluation risk.27 This 
equity regulation is eased in the financial sector due to the fact that the financial sector is, in 
comparison to the non-financial sector, much more homogenous in regard to the assets held – 
the financial risks and the balance sheets are similar among all banks and insurance compa-
nies. 
2.2 Basel III 
Since the financial crisis of 2008/9 the Basel Committee has developed the concept of strong-
er capital buffers for banks to ensure the stability of the financial system. This will in turn 
improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks from financial and economic stress, and 
therefore, reduce the risk of a spill over from the financial sector into the real economy.28 In 
the view of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision one of the main reasons for the re-
cent financial crisis was the excessive leverage built up by banks combined with an erosion of 
26 Handschin (fn. 12) at p. 194. 
27 Peter O. Mülbert, ‘Corporate Governance of Banks’, 10 EBOR (2009), pp. 411 et seq. at pp. 412, 422. 
28 Basel Committee on Baking Supervision, ‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks 
and banking systems’, December 2010 at p. 1 <http://bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf> [Regulatory Framework]. 
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the level and quality of the capital base29 – in simpler terms not enough equity. “[T]he global 
banking system entered the crisis with an insufficient level of capital and not enough high-
quality capital.”30 As a consequence Basel III31 defines the common equity more precisely, 
narrows the qualification of fist-tier capital,32 brings in prudential filters, and enhances disclo-
sure requirements.33 
 
Both, the increase in quantity and the increase in quality of the prescribed first-tier capital 
constrains approaches that banks may take to their asset structure and their risk behaviour. As 
a consequence banks will be forced to lower their all over risk exposure. This can be achieved 
by adapting the risk structure of the held assets or by building up first-tier capital.34 
 
The superior function of equity (in the financial sector) is acknowledged. The scepticism re-
garding an increase of capital requirements which suggests that “capital is more expensive 
                                                 
29 Regulatory Framework (fn. 28) at p. 1 n. 3. By an increase in leverage both, potential rewards as well as po-
tential losses are increased. Leverage increases the overall risk exposure. Ross, Westerfield, Jordan (fn. 1) at p. 
23. 
30 Hervé Hannoun, ‘Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework’, International Bank of Settlements Publi-
cation, at p. 10 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>. 
31 For the phasing in of the requirements see Basel III Compliance Professional Association, The Basel III Ac-
cord <http://www.basel-iii-accord.com>. For a comparison of Basel II and III regulation requirements see Mari-
anne Ojo, ‘Basel III and Responding to the recent Financial Crisis: Progress made by the Basel Committee in 
relation to the Need for Increased Bank Capital and Increased Quality of Loss Absorbing Capital’, 22 September 
2010, at p. 4 et seq. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680886>. Basel III increases the quantitative requirements of 
core first-tire capital to 4.5%. Additionally the banks will be required to build a ‘Capital Conservation Buffer’ of 
an additional 2.5%, leading to a core capital of 7%. The ‘Capital Conservation Buffer’ may be undercut in times 
of distress. Further a ‘Countercyclical Buffer’ between 0 and 2.5% shall cope with specific risks arising form 
national markets in which the respective bank operates. The first-tier core capital will be steadily built up 
through a transition period until 2015, the ‘Capital Conservation Buffer’ until 2019 and the overall first-tire 
capital must reach a level of 6% by 2015. Furthermore, second-tier capital instruments are harmonized and the 
third-tier capital is eliminated. Regulatory Framework (fn. 28) at p. 17 n. 57 et seq. 
32 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector’, Consultative 
Document, Bank for International Settlements Publication, December 2009, at p. 1 et seq. 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf>. Under a stronger consideration of the risk exposure in combination with 
additional leverage ratio restrictions, restrictions on dividend distributions and the promotion of countercyclical 
buffers. Core first-tire capital must consist of common shares and retained earnings. For the rare case of non-
joint stock bank companies a set of principles leads to comparable levels of first-tire capital. Regulatory Frame-
work (fn. 28) at p. 13 n. 53. Forms of hybrid capitals are still admissible up to 15% as first-tier capital, but will 
eventually be phased out. Regulatory Framework (fn. 28) at p. 2 and p. 13 n. 59, for a definition of the ‘common 
shares’ see p. 13 n. 53. 
33 Hannoun (fn. 30) at p. 11. 
34 Handschin (fn. 12) at pp. 201 et seq.; also supra 1.3.4. 
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than other forms of funding”35 can be rebutted.36 Even significantly higher equity require-
ments for banks entail no additional costs, except those ‘externally’ caused by (wrong) tax37 
incentives, implementation and supervision. 38 Furthermore, calculations in regard to costs 
caused by the implementation of increased capital requirements should only be considered 
along with the thereby created value in the long run – costs are more easily calculated than 
benefits39 and might therefore provide for a bias in favour of over-leveraging. 
 
Basel III implements a set of rules that promote stability in the financial sector by linking 
quantitative equity requirements to qualitative equity requirements, i.e. the equity is linked to 
the risk structure of the held assets.40 Other instruments such as stress-testing41, limitations to 
the leverage ratio42 and the countercyclical buffer43 relate the adequateness of equity to the 
                                                 
35 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, , ‘Countercyclical capital buffer proposal’, Consultative Document, 
July 2010 at p. 2 <http://www.bis.org>; also Anat R. Admati et al., ‘Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the 
Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive’, The Rock Center for Corporate Govern-
ance at Stanford University Working Paper Series No. 86, Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 2063, Draft, 20 
October 2010, at pp. 8 et seq. 
36 ‘The important issue is at what point does the probability of financial distress so increase the cost of equity 
and debt that it outweighs the benefit of the tax relief on debt?’ Arnold (fn. 1) at pp. 569 and 578. For the func-
tion of the overall cost of capital a U-shaped relation for the equity/debt rate is postulated. However a best 
debt/equity ratio cannot scientifically be established. 
37 Such as capital tax or tax on profits. In Switzerland realized capital profits from the sale of shares are exempt 
from the income tax at the level of a natural person (Art. 16 (3) DBG); this might have a positive effect on the 
equity level. For findings of effects of countercyclical fiscal policies see Philippe Aghion, David Hemous and 
Enisse Kharroubi, ‘Cyclical Fiscal Policy, Credit Constraints, and Industry Growth’, BIS Working Paper No. 
340, February 2011, at p. 31 <www.bis.org>. 
38 Admati et al. (fn. 35) at p. 1 et seq.: the authors are skeptical whether the prescribed level of equity is suffi-
cient. It is argued that an even significantly higher equity requirement would only limit a bank’s risk structure. 
These findings may also hold true in the non-financial sector. However, if research would show that in fact equi-
ty is more expensive in that sense in the non-financial sector, one reason might be that companies are able to 
externalize some of  the risk to creditors that are unable to negotiate conditions, and therefore are unable to con-
sider the counterparties risk bearing ability. 
39 See P. Angelini et al., ‘Basel III : Long-term impact on economic performance and fluctuations’, BIS Working 
Paper No. 338, at pp. 19 et seq. <www.bis.org>. 
40 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Calculation of minimum capital requirements and capital buffers: 
a top-down Approach’, Bank for International Settlements, October 2010 at p. et seq. <www.bis.org>. 
41 The stress-testing controls risks arising from the banking and the trading book. In order to comply, the value-
at-risk must withhold a simulated a one year period of continued significant financial stress. Regulatory Frame-
work (fn. 28) at p. 3 n. 12. For implementation in the EU see Directive 2010/76/EU. 
42 Regulatory Framework (fn. 28) at p. 3 n. 12, 16. 
43  The countercyclical buffer controls valuation risks arising from changing economic cycles. Regulatory 
Framework (fn. 28) at p. 5 n. 19; for more forward looking provisions (replacement of IAS 39) at p. 6 n. 23. 
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exposed risks. They are tools to detect further off-balance sheet risks,44 and thus help to make 
revaluation risks45 controllable. 
“Liquidity is the ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they 
come due, without incurring unacceptable losses.”46 To strengthen the liquidity, the regulation 
requires sufficient high-quality liquidity resources for both a one month-47 as well as for a one 
year-period, based on respective stress scenarios.48 High-quality resources are held assets that 
are either liquid or can be made liquid at anytime without unacceptable losses. Therefore, 
sufficient assets with low revaluation risks must be held in relation to outstanding obligations. 
This has the effect that a strong liquidity regime also leads to a strong equity to asset risk-
relationship. These safeguards, like the minimal capital requirements, are required to ensure 
liquidity; they are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. 
2.3 Summary, preliminary conclusions 
The aims and solutions of Basel III show and prove the relationship between equity and fi-
nancial risks. The aim of the rules is to reduce the risk of a failure of a bank. The solution 
found is to define specific requirements regarding the quantity (percentage of balance sheet 
44 ‘One of the most procyclical dynamics has been the failure of risk management and capital frameworks to 
capture key exposures – such as complex trading activities, resecuritisations and exposures to off-balance sheet 
vehicles’. Regulatory Framework (fn. 28) at p. 4 n. 20. 
45 A main problem arose from the pro cyclical effects of the Basel II internal credit risk models used. European 
Central Bank, Financial Stability Review, December 2009, at p. 149 et seq. 
<http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/index.en.html>; Ojo (fn. 31) at p. 3. The tendency of market participants to 
behave in a pro cyclical manner was amongst other reasons induced by the used accounting standards for mar-
ket-to-market assets and held-to-maturity loans. Regulatory Framework (fn. 28) at p. 5 n. 18. 
46 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervi-
sion’, September 2008 at p. 1 <http://www.bis.org>. 
47 The controlling instrument is the ‘Liquidity Coverage Ratio’. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Ba-
sel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurements, standards and monitoring’, December 2010 at p. 
3 et seq. <http://www.bis.org> [Framework for Liquidity Risk]. 
48 ‘Net Stable Funding Ratio’. Framework for Liquidity Risk (fn. 47) at pp. 25 n. 119 et seq. 
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total) and quality of equity by using rules which require a diligent asset management and the 
control of risks (which relate to higher profitability) through additional equity.49 
Some national legislations have even gone beyond the Basle III equity-requirements (in some 
legislation primarily targeted at banks considered as too big to fail50). The clear object of this 
move is to create a competitive advantage for their own financial market by requiring the 
banks to further enhance their risk bearing ability. 
The quantitative and qualitative rules on equity for the financial market are very specific and 
refer to bank-specific risks, assets and liabilities. Such specific rules like these are possible, 
because the balance sheets of banks and insurance companies are similar; they are comparable 
and all structured in the same way. 
2.4 The procedural rules, regulatory enforcement 
The enforcement of substantive rules of the Basel III regulation requires close monitoring. To 
improve market discipline, disclosure requirements will be tightened with respect to all ele-
ments of the capital. 51 The European Central Bank has highlighted the importance of in-
creased transparency of the financial institution’s asset exposure for further financial stabil-
ity.52 For the purpose of supervision the Basel Committee introduces monitoring tools to be 
49 Also see Mülbert (fn. 27) at pp. 433 et seq. 
50 For Switzerland: Commission of Experts for limiting the economic risks posed by large companies, ‘Final 
report of the “too big to fail” commission of experts’, 30 September 2010 
<http://www.sif.admin.ch/dokumentation/00514/00519/00592/index.html?lang=en>. ‘The new regulations set 
out under Basel III are intended as minimum standards. They are binding on all banks and are therefore designed 
to apply to all international financial institutions, irrespective of their systemic importance. The calibration is 
geared to the average, and fails to address the TBTF problem effectively. Moreover, the calibration does not take 
into account the special situation in Switzerland.’ 
51 Regulatory Framework (fn. 28) at p. 2 n. 8 and p. 27 n. 91. 
52 European Central Bank, ‘Financial Stability Review, Summary’, December 2010 
<http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/summary201012.en.html>; also see Mülbert (fn. 27) at p. 431: ‘know-your-
structure’. 
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used by the national supervisors in order to assess the liquidity risk of their banks. As specific 
liquidity risks may arise from different jurisdictions national supervisors will need to develop 
additional tools that cope with those risks.53 These additional regulatory requirements demon-
strate the link between substantive rules (on equity) and regulatory enforcement in the finan-
cial sector. 54 
 
Regulatory enforcement of substantive rules in the financial sector was first implemented in 
the 1930s when the focus was on national activities. 55 Subsequently this was extended into 
the international dimension, first limited to international cash flows56 and, then after the intro-
duction of the current-account convertibility in the 1960s extended towards a comprehensive 
global financial regulation.57 Although there was a broad international consensus that free 
markets are beneficial for economic growth and that free capital markets lead to a more effi-
cient allocation of capital, the ambiguity of this relationship58 and the danger of pushing mar-
kets to poorly regulated offshore centres showed the necessity for additional regulation. This 
was implemented by the Basel accords, standards and guidelines, which are legally non-
                                                 
53 Framework for Liquidity Risk (fn. 47) at p. 31 n. 138. 
54 National supervisors reliance on external auditors’ expertise has increased. As most supervisors increasingly 
rely on audit to complement supervisory processes, the issue of transparency at the level of the audited banks and 
the audit firms, is of significant concern for effective supervision . Furthermore, high standards in audit enhance 
market confidence, particularly in times of financial distress. Other concerns arise at the level of the audit firms. 
Major audit firms have globalized, resulting in complex firm structures and a lack of transparency at the level of 
the audit firms. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘External audit quality and banking supervision, Bank 
for International Settlements’, 8 December  2008 at pp. 4 et seq. < http://www.bis.org>. 
55 Piet Clement, ‘The Missing Link: International Banking Supervision in the Archives of the BIS’, in Stefano 
Battilossi, Jaime Reis (eds.), State and Financial Systems in Europe and the USA (Fanham, Ashgate 2010) at pp. 
167, 170. 
56 Maurice Obsterfeld, Alan M. Taylor, Global Capital Markets. Integration, Crisis, and Growth (Cambridge 
2004) at pp. 126 et seq.; Cathrine R. Schenk, ‘The Regulation of International Financial Markets from the 1950s 
to the 1990s’, in Stefano Battilossi, Jaime Reis (eds.), State and Financial Systems in Europe and the USA (Fan-
ham, Ashgate 2010) at pp. 149 et seq. and 150. 
57 Clement (fn. 55) at pp. 168 et seq. 
58 ‘[There is] no evidence that abolishing capital controls per se leads to higher growth… but … quite good rea-
son to believe that financial liberalization significantly increases the risk of a subsequent financial/currency cri-
sis.’ Nicolas Crafts, Globalization and Growth in the Twentieth Century, IMF Working Papers WP/00/44, 2000 
at p. 51; Nicolas Crafts, ‘Globalisation an Economic Growth. A Historical Perspective’, 27 World Economy 
(2004) at pp. 45 et seq. 
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binding, but acknowledged by the central bankers and are thus ‘as good as law’.59 Today the 
Basel rules are integrated into EU-law60 and have become international law through various 
formal and informal accords.61 Even in countries which emphasize the free market such as the 
United States, the United Kingdom and also Switzerland, the need for strict banking regula-
tions are undisputed given the specific risks arising from the financial sector to the general 
economy. 
3. Rules on equity in the non-financial sector (in selected legislations) 
3.1 Minimal Capital requirements 
 
Most continental European jurisdictions require a certain minimal amount of equity as a min-
imal legal capital when setting up a corporation (Germany: 50,000 Euro; 62  Switzerland: 
100,000 CHF;63 France: 225,000 Euro for listed public companies and 37,000 Euro for other 
public companies64; the Second Company Law Directive foresees a minimum share capital of 
25,000 Euro65). Over time political factors in all jurisdictions have lead to a reduction of the 
legal capital in order to achieve a low entry level to establish corporations, with the declared 
                                                 
59 Steven Solomon, The Confidence Game. How Unelected Central Bankers Are Governing the Changed Global 
Economy (New York and London, Simon & Schuster 1995) at p. 435. 
60 Capital Requirements Directive 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. For the implementation of the Basel III accord 
amendments will be made after a public consultation phase. See 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/index_en.htm>. Also see Iain MacNeil, ‘The Trajectory of 
Regulatory Reform in the UK in the Wake of the Financial Crisis’, 11 EBOR (2010), pp. 483 et seq. at pp. 509 et 
seq. 
61 The G20 reached an agreement on the implementation of the Basel III rules at the Korea summit on the 11 and 
12 November 2010. <http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/11/seoulsummit_declaration.pdf>. Decisions by the 
G20 are not legally binding. 
62 AktG § 7. 
63 OR Art. 621. 
64 French Commercial Code [CCom.] Art. L-224-2. 
65 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC, Art. 6 (1), paid up to at least one fourth, Art. 9 (1). For the European 
Private Company (SPE) see Mathias M. Siems, Leif Herzog and Erik Rosenhäger, ‘The Protection of Creditors 
of a European Private Company (SPE), 12 EBOR (2011), pp. 148 et seq. at pp. 156 et seq. 
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purpose to stimulate economic activity. 66 In many common law jurisdictions legal capital 
rules have fallen out of favour as an instrument to protect creditors.67 In many states within 
the US, legal capital rules have been abolished, and in others withered.68 Nevertheless, provi-
sions on equity cushions and distribution limits based on prudent accounting can often be 
found in credit contracts under US law.69 Many Europeans chose to incorporate their business 
in the United Kingdom, where the capital rules are relatively permissive.70 This triggered a 
debate over the benefit and usefulness of legal capital rules in Europe.71 
3.2 Provisions for future risks? 
In traditional civil law bookkeeping it is permissible to create provisions for future risks and 
in contemplation of future investments. Such provisions are hidden reserves and therefore, not 
compliant with true and fair bookkeeping according to IFRS standards. According to true and 
fair bookkeeping rules provisions can only be formed for uncertain future asset-reductions 
resulting from past events though not for future risks and investments.72 Similar rules allow-
ing provisions for future risks exist under US GAAP.73 In part these rules compensate im-
pairment rules which allow a revaluation of assets only if the loss is not recoverable. This 
broader understanding of provisions in civil law bookkeeping and US GAAP is consistent 
66 Whether the legal capital of, eg Euro 37,000 for other public companies (France, CCom. Art. L-224-2) or Euro 
50,000 (Germany, AktG § 7) is an entry barrier to an own company respectively a negative economic stimulant 
is to be challenged. The reduction of tax and bureaucratic hurdles related to the set-up and the operation of a 
company would probably be more effectual. 
67 Armour (fn. 4) at p. 2. 
68 Bayless Manning, James Hanks, Legal Capital, 3nd edn. (New York, Foundation Press 1990) at pp. 30 et seq. 
69 Wolfgang Schön (fn. 2) at p. 440; John Armour, ‘Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a 
Modern Copany Law’, 63 Modern Law Review (2000) at p. 355 et seq. 
70 John Armour, ‘Who Should Make Corporate Law: EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition’, 48 Cur-
rent Legal Problems (2005) at p. 369. For a further discussion on legal capital requirements and the Second 
Company Law Directive within the EU see Horst Heidenmüller, Barbara Gruenewald, Ulrich Noack, ‘Minimum 
Capital in the System of Legal Capital’, in Marcus Lutter (ed.), Legal Capital in Europe (Berlin, de Gruyter 
2006) at pp. 17 et seq. 
71 Armour (fn. 4) at p. 3. 
72 IAS 37. 
73 For Asset Retirements and Environmental Obligation (ASC 410). Exit or Disposal Cost Obligations ASC 420. 
 19 
with the concept of equity as risk reserve, as it creates equity with regard to future financial 
risks. 
3.3 Valuation rules; creation of additional equity if going concern ability is in 
peril 
 
Accounting valuation rules allow for the valuing of assets and liabilities based on the going 
concern assumption. “Under the going concern assumption, an entity is viewed as continuing 
in business for the foreseeable future. General purpose financial statements are prepared on a 
going concern basis, unless management either intends to liquidate the entity or to cease oper-
ations, or has no realistic alternative but to do so.”74 This means that assets will have to be re-
valued at their liquidation value, and additional liabilities (reserves) might have to be created 
to cover the additional risks deriving from the endangered going concern ability. Provisions to 
cover liquidation costs have to be made, etc. 
 
The reduction of the value of assets to the liquidation value has the same effect on the balance 
sheet and the nominal equity as is seen by the creation of hidden reserves. First, this reduces 
the distributable profit and creates additional real equity to cover the risks related to the en-
dangered going concern ability. In a well-capitalized company this reduces the potential to 
distribute profits, but creates no risks for the creditors. In a weakly capitalized company this 
reduction of the nominal equity (by the allocation of real equity to cover the risks deriving 
from the endangered going concern ability) forces the company to change its risk behaviour to 
the new situation and necessitates additional equity which would have to be provided for by 
the shareholders. If they refuse to recapitalize the company and the remaining equity is insuf-
ficient to continue the operations, the management has to try to liquidate the company before 
                                                 
74 ‘Going Concern Assumption’ IAS 570. 
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creditors are harmed. The rules regarding the valuation of assets and liabilities if the going 
concern ability is in peril are rules, which, in a specific risk situation, require additional equity 
or a new risk profile. 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Second Company Law Directive 
 
The Second Company Law Directive requires a minimum capital of 25,000 Euros.75 The 
distibution regime is limited to a mere balance sheet test in combination with a partial earned 
surplus test.76 The Second Directive does not require additional first-tier capital such as non-
distributable legal reserves or statutory reserves. 77  Therefore, in the absence of further 
national requirements only the subscribed capital must be taken into account for the purpose 
of dividend distribution under Art. 15 (1) of the Directive. Alteration of the subscribed capital 
is subjet to a decision of the general assembly of the company.78 An indirect reduction of the 
subscribed capital through the purchase of own shares without a resolution of the general 
assembly may, as an exception, be permitted by national law under Art. 19(2) “where the 
acquisition of a company's own shares is necessary to prevent serious and imminent harm to 
                                                 
75 Art. 6 (1) of the Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976; for admissive reduction below 
that amount see Art. 34 (capital reduction below the minimal capital requirement followed by a subsequent capi-
tal increase). 
76 Art. 15 (1). 
77 With the exception of reserves formed under Art. 22 (1) (b) of the Directive for the purchase of own shares, 
this reserve is non-distributable. 
78 For capital increase Art. 25 (1); for capital reduction Art. 30. 
21 
the company.” If own shares are purchased, an non-distributable reserve must be formed; the 
purchase of own shares cannot increase distributable profits.79 
Where there is a reduction of the subscribed capital creditors may have the possibility to 
invoke the safeguards under Art. 32 of the Directive. The protection of this article is available 
if the assets of the company, are considered insufficent in the circumstances or the creditor 
does not have other adequate safeguards.80 
Distributions may therefore be made under the Second Directive provided that post 
distribution the company’s assets equal all liabilites, and provided the amount of the 
distribution does not exceed the amount of the profits of the last financial year plus “any 
profits brought forward and sums drawn from reserves available for this purpose, less any 
losses brought forward and sums placed to reserve in accordance with the law or the 
statutes.”81 
3.5 Rickford Report 
The concept of a static and formalistic equity requirement for corporation has to be ques-
tioned given its inflexibility and also due to the fact that reality is much too complex for such 
79 Art. 22 (1) (b). 
80 Art. 32 (1) as amended by Directive 2006/68/EC: ‘In the event of a reduction in the subscribed capital, at least 
the creditors whose claims antedate the publication of the decision on the reduction shall at least have the right to 
obtain security for claims which have not fallen due by the date of that publication. Member States may not set 
aside such a right unless the creditor has adequate safeguards, or unless such safeguards are not necessary having 
regard to the assets of the company. Member States shall lay down the conditions for the exercise of the right 
provided for in the first subparagraph. In any event, Member States shall ensure that the creditors are authorised 
to apply to the appropriate administrative or judicial authority for adequate safeguards provided that they can 
credibly demonstrate that due to the reduction in the subscribed capital the satisfaction of their claims is at stake, 
and that no adequate safeguards have been obtained from the company.’ Art. 32 (2) ‘The laws of the Member 
States shall also stipulate at least that the reduction shall be void or that no payment may be made for the benefit 
of the shareholders, until the creditors have obtained satisfaction or a court has decided that their application 
should not be acceded to.’ Art. 32 (3) ‘This Article shall apply where the reduction in the subscribed capital is 
brought about by the total or partial waiving of the payment of the balance of the shareholders’ contributions.’ 
81 ‘Earned surplus test’ under Art. 15 (1) (c). 
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simplistically structured rules. It is said, that these rules cannot satisfy the purpose of the pro-
tection of shareholders, creditors and the company82 and instead a scheme is suggested that 
allows payments to shareholders whenever a balance sheet test shows no over indebtedness 
and a solvency test the going concern ability of the company.83 
 
The solvency test requires a procedure to affirm that distributions to shareholders do not fur-
ther the risk of insolvency. The solvency-test in the United Kingdom allows the distribution 
of dividends as long as the solvency (with reasonable ex ante sight) seems given for another 
year.84 The New Zealand approach differs somewhat. There, the solvency test is “whether the 
company is able to pay its debts as they become due in the normal course of business; and the 
value of the company's assets is greater than the value of its liabilities, including contingent 
liabilities.”85 Furthermore directors are required to “sign a certificate stating that, in their 
opinion, the company will, immediately after the distribution, satisfy the solvency test and the 
grounds for that opinion.”86 
 
The weakness of the solvency test is that it focuses on liquidity and that the asset valuation 
risks are addressed only indirectly.87 A solvency test relies on the board’s subjective assess-
ment of future outlooks, and therefore, cannot assure objective values of the underlying valua-
tions.88 As the solvency test relies more on the capacity of the company to pay its debts, and 
not on a balance-sheet over indebtedness, future income can be considered in this test, in the 
                                                 
82 Paolo Santella, Riccardo Turrini, ‘Capital Maintenance in the EU: Is the Second Company Law Directive 
Really That Restrictive?’, 9 EBOR (2008) at pp. 341 et seq. and at p. 460; Rickford Report (fn. 2) at pp. 943 et 
seq.; Eva Micheler, ‘England’, in Marcus Lutter (ed.), Legal Capital in Europe (Berlin, de Gruyter 2006) at pp. 
414 et seq. 
83 Rickford Report (fn. 2) at p. 971 et seq. 
84 British Companies Act 2006, s 643 (1) (b) (ii): ‘has also formed the opinion … that the company will be able 
to pay (or otherwise discharge) its debts as they fall due during the year immediately following that date.’ 
85 New Zealand Companies Act s 4 (1). 
86 New Zealand Companies Act s 52 (2). 
87 Also see Wolfgang Schön (fn. 2) at pp. 440 et seq.: ‘The argument that such creditors [unable to adjust] are 
only interested in the present liquidity is unconvincing’. 
88 Also see Wolfgang Schön (fn. 2) at p. 445. 
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same way it is included in a liquidity test.89 For this reason the Rickford Report proposes as 
second test, a bare balance sheet net asset test, which focuses on the balance sheet, not on 
solvency, but without any equity-barriers regarding distributions to shareholders.90 However, 
one of the main weaknesses of the balance sheet test is that it lacks the ability to detect off 
balance sheet liabilities. As the assets shown on the balance sheet are book values and not real 
values it is reasoned that the application of any balance sheet test should not be too rigid. 91 
Distributions made on the basis of a balance sheet test alone or in combination with a solven-
cy test thus fail to preserve the needed equity in relation to the risk bearing ability of the com-
pany. The more the book value diverges from the real value of an asset, the lower the protec-
tion of adequate equity by a balance sheet test becomes. 
3.6 Critical remarks 
 
The concepts described in the Rickford Report imply a perfectly correct valuation of assets. 
They ignore the risk of false valuations and the risk (even if all valuations were correct) that 
the valuation basis may change, as well as the fact that the accounting-valuation rules do not 
cover these risks. As a minimum those risks, which the accounting rules do not cover, should 
be controlled by equity. 
 
A system which protects only the diligent and ‘market-mighty’ creditors cannot be justified 
and is naive.92 These are the very creditors who are in a position to calculate their own in-
vestment risk93 and behave accordingly (for example, by only giving credit against collateral). 
                                                 
89 Rickford Report (fn. 2) at p. 975: ‘any more that that (the result of the bare bet asset test) is the maximum 
which it would be prudent to distribute.’ 
90 Rickford Report (fn. 2) at pp. 975 et seq. 
91 Rickford Report (fn. 2) at p. 976. 
92 Schön (fn. 2) at p. 440. For concerns regarding the shareholders right to approve reduction of capital see 
Micheler (fn. 82) at pp. 425 et seq. 
93 Rickford Report (fn. 2) at 919. 
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Such creditors are, in fact, not in need of protection at all. A system of that kind protects the 
interests of these groups at the cost of weaker and less professional creditors, such as trade 
creditors and small subcontractors, who lack bargaining and informational resources94 Fur-
thermore it is at the expense of tort creditors,95 who by definition do not negotiate collateral 
before ‘giving credit’ to the tortfeasor. 
3.7 Duties of the board of directors regarding the financial risk bearing abil-
ity 
The relationship between equity and risk bearing ability is accepted in the legislation of many 
jurisdictions. These equity related rules are – however – not set up to define the necessary 
amount of equity. They are embedded in the general liability rules for the board of directors96 
and are applied if the risk behaviour of the board is not in line with the equity-driven risk 
bearing ability of the company.97 
94 Holger Fleischer, ‘Legal Capital: A Navigation System for Corporate Law Scholarship’ 7 EBOR (2006) at p. 
30; Armour (fn. 4) at p. 6. 
95 Schön (fn. 2) at p. 441 et seq.: legal capital as collective contractual offer that particularly protects involuntary 
creditors, creditors unable to adjust and lowers transaction costs for all creditors. 
96 Switzerland: OR Arts. 717 and 754; Germany: AktG § 93 (1); France: Ccom. Arts. L 225-251 and L 225-257; 
United Kingdom: under Section 172 (1) (a) of the Companies Act 2006 a director must not take from his subjec-
tive point of view risks that endanger the company’s long-term success; Goeffrey Morse et al. (eds.), Palmer’s 
Company Law: Annotated Guide to the Companies Act 2006 (reprint, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) at p. 167: ‘The 
directors must make decisions that are calculated to be for the long-term benefit of the members [of the compa-
ny] as a whole.’ Paul L. Davies, Sarah Worthington, Eva Micheler, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern 
Company Law, 8th edn. (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) at 11-5. Rolf Watter and Katja Roth Pellanda, ‘Art. 
717’, in Heinrich Honsell, Nedim P. Vogt, Rolf Watter (eds.), Basler Kommentar, Obligationenrecht II, Art. 
530-1186 OR, 3rd edn. (Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn 2008) at n. 10 and 13; Eric Homburger, ‘Art. 707-726’, in 
Peter Gauch, Jörg Schmid (eds.), Zürcher Kommentar zum Obligationenrecht (Zurich, Schulthess 1996) at n. 
816. Böckli (fn. 11) at § 13 n. 563 et seq. and § 14 n. 253. 
97 However, these duties can be understood as duties owed to the shareholders, creditors or the corporation itself. 
Switzerland: OR Art. 756 (1); Germany: AktG § 93 (2); France: CCom. Art. L 225-251; United Kingdom: Com-
pany Act, s 170 (1); Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co v Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services 
Ltd [1983] Ch 258 CA; Peskin v. Anderson [2001] 1 BCLC 372 CA; Derek French, Stephen W. Mayson and 
Christopher L. Ryan, French & Ryan on Company Law (Oxford University Press 2009) at 16.3.3; only the com-
pany itself can bring in an action for a breach of duty; Goeffrey Morse, Charlesworth’s Company Law, 17th edn. 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell 2005) at pp. 164 and 298 et seq.: only under special circumstances fiduciary duties 
arise which place directors in a fiduciary capacity towards shareholders or creditors. 
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In the legislation of both civil and common law jurisdictions there is broad agreement that 
rules are necessary in order to maintain a sufficient equity level, be this by way of a liquidity 
or solvency-test, a balance sheet test, or through rules on capital protection. Only under “la-
boratory conditions” in a perfectly functioning market, where every participant is perfectly 
informed and in a position to freely adjust, are no rules for capital maintenance needed what-
soever. In the real world we must assume that some creditors have neither the information nor 
the ability to adjust, and are therefore exposed to the externalisation of risks and costs by 
companies and certain creditors.98 Further creditors capable of adjusting often subject their 
loan to conditions that impede the company’s ability to engage in transactions that would in-
crease the risk for the creditor, therefore “there are potentially significant savings to be made 
through company law providing ‘creditor terms’ which restrict such transactions.”99 
 
In jurisdictions which follow the English lead, the West Mercia line of cases requires directors 
to consider the risk of insolvency at any given time. Where a threat of insolvency is signifi-
cant, directors are bound to make greater provisions in order to protect creditors at the ex-
pense of shareholders. The protection required varies in relation to the severity of the 
threat.100 In the United Kingdom, as well as in the United States, the majority holds as a con-
sequence of the prevailing shareholderism,101 that such a fiduciary duty exists only in regard 
                                                 
98 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’, Yale International Centre for 
Finance etc., Working Paper No. 00-99, January 2000 at p. 10 
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/papers.shtml>: ‘The reason for these 
rules, however, is that there are unique problems of creditor contracting that are integral to the corporate form, 
owing principally to the presence of limited liabilities as a structural characteristic of that form.’ 
99 Armour (fn. 4) at p. 9. 
100 West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd (1988) 4 BCC 30 (CA UK) and Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd (in liq) 
[1985] 1 NZLR 242 (CA NZ); see Rickford Report (fn. 2) at p. 985.  
101 Andrew Keay, ‘Moving Towards Stakeholderism? Constituency Statutes, Enlightened Shareholder Value, 
and More: Much Ado About Little?’, 22 EBLR (2011) at pp. 1 et seq., for a discussion of the stakeholder-
friendly terminology of Section 172 (2) of the Companies Act 2006; Modern Company Law Review: Competing 
the Structure, a Consultation Document from the Company Law Review Steering Group, November 2000, Chap-
ter 3 Section 3.5.; Hansmann, Kraakman (fn. 98) at p. 7. For the ‘enlightened shareholder value’ also see 
Levinus Timmerman, ‘Principles of Prevailing Dutch Company Law’, 11 EBOR (2010), pp. 609 et seq. at p. 615 
et seq.; Douglas Braid, Todd Henderson, ‘Other People’s Money’, 60 Stanford Law Review (2009), pp. 1309 at 
pp. 1323 et seq. 
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to the company and not in regard to the creditors themselves. It is argued that the wrongful 
trading provision102 addresses the issue of creditor protection, and thus, there is no need to 
treat creditors ‘as if they were shareholders’103. In continental Europe a more pluralistic, or 
better, consolidated approach is widely accepted.104 As the board forms the will of the com-
pany as a legal entity and acts on behalf of the company, it is obliged to safeguard the inter-
ests arising out of contractual relationships between the company and third parties as well as 
those arising out of tort. 
 
In US case law and doctrine it has also been upheld that there is a duty of the directors to-
wards creditors in the vicinity of insolvency.105 Among others Lipson106 states that (on the 
one side) there is in general no duty of directors towards creditors but that (on the other side): 
“The corollary, however, is that duty should fill gaps to remedy inequitable conduct when 
there is no meaningful remedy at law.”107 This is especially the case when involuntary credi-
tors such as tort creditors108 or creditors unable to adjust are involved. With this statement 
Lipson opens the door to a civil law type creditor protection, that includes the duty to safe-
guard the interests of all creditors: if there is in certain circumstances a duty of care towards 
tort creditors or non-adjustable creditors (which prevents for example the board from taking 
excessive financial risks), then such duty of care will protect not only privileged creditors, 
but, in fact all creditors. A systematically correct differentiation regarding the protection of 
creditors starts with a general rule, which includes a duty of care regarding all creditors. It, 
                                                 
102 UK: Insolvency Act 1986 Section 214; for US Fraudulent Transfer Law see Andreas Engert, ‘Life Without 
Legal Capital: Lessons from American Law’, in Marcus Lutter (ed.), Legal Capital in Europe (Berlin, de Gruy-
ter 2006) at pp. 669 et seq. 
103 Jonathan C. Lipson, ‘The Expressive Function of Directors’ Duties to Creditors’, 12 Stanford Journal of Law, 
Business & Finance (2007) at p. 224. 
104 As well as Japan and other East-Asian jurisdictions. Keay (fn. 101) at pp. 6 et seq.; also see Mülbert (fn. 27) 
at p. 428. 
105 For an oversight of the respective case law see Lipson (fn. 103) at p. 224 et seq. 
106 Lipson (fn. 103) at p. 280. For an ‘enlightened shareholderism’ see Keay (fn. 101) at p. 2. 
107 Lipson (fn. 103) at p. 281. 
108 Jonathan C. Lipson, ‘Directors Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance ant the Financially Distressed Compa-
ny’, 50 UCLA Law Review (2003) at p. 1189. 
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however, combines this with restrictions regarding those adjustable creditors who rely on that 
duty, where the damage arising out of a breach of such duty would have been avoidable by 
the adjustable creditor. 
The wrongful trading provision sets specific rules regarding the duty of directors.109 If assets 
are transferred in the vicinity of insolvency in a way that make creditors as a group worse off, 
this is considered to be a fraudulent transfer of assets.110 Wrongful trading copes with a viola-
tion of the capital regime in circumstances where the risk induced through wrongful trading 
materializes, and thus, might provide for an ex ante protection similar to the corresponding 
civil law provisions of the lex pauliana.111 The entry of business failure or bankruptcy de-
pends on a subjective detection of a lost going concern ability. Although for the British 
wrongful trading provision case law does not require company directors to respond to a crisis 
before the onset of insolvency112 it is held that the broad language of the respective section113 
allows for such interpretation.114 In Germany115 for example the lex pauliana rules take effect 
when the directors realize that there is an excess of liabilities over assets.116 If we relate the 
wrongful trading provisions and the pauliana rules to the duties of the board of directors we 
see that they require the diligent application of accounting rules and risk management. Addi-
109 UK Insolvency Act 1986, Section 214 (2) (b): ‘at some time before the commencement of the winding up of 
the company, that person knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the com-
pany would avoid going into insolvent liquidation’. For an analysis of these duties under British and German 
fraudulent transfer law see Thomas Bachner, ‘Wrongful Trading – A New European Model for Creditor Protec-
tion’, 5 EBOR (2005) at pp. 297 et seq.; Engert (fn. 102) at pp. 669 et seq.; Gerhard Wagner, ‘Distributions to 
Shareholders and Fraudulent Transfer Law’, 7 EBOR (2006), pp. 217 et seq. at p. 219 et seq. 
110 Douglas G. Braid, ‘Legal Approaches to Restricting Distributions to Shareholders: The Role of Fraudulent 
Transfer Law’, 7 EBOR (2006), pp. 199 et seq. at p. 203. 
111 Both stem from the roman actio pauliana. Engert (fn. 102) at p. 669. For Europe see Christopher G. Paulus, 
‘Claw-back Rules and Creditors’ Protection’, in Marcus Lutter (ed.), Legal Capital in Europe (Berlin, de Gruy-
ter 2006), at pp. 325 et seq. 
112 Bachner (fn. 109) at p. 318. 
113 UK Insolvency Act 1986 Section 214 (2) (b). 
114 Bachner (fn. 109) at p. 302: ‘the responsibility of directors, as described in Re Continental Assurance, does 
not go beyond a continuous and careful monitoring of whether the company is still solvent’; Ian F. Flecher, The 
Law of Insolvency, 3rd edn. (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2002) para. 27-019: Professor Fletcher even considers 
that the mere probability of insolvency could trigger director’s liability towards creditors under the respective 
provision. 
115 For private limited companies § 64 (1) GmbHG; for public limited companies § 92 (2) AktG. 
116 Also Bachner (fn. 109) at p. 299; with a translation of the respective German rule. 
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tionally the lex pauliana and the wrongful trading provision (under admissible possible inter-
pretation) imply the duty of the board to constantly assess the going concern ability and the 
risk exposure of the company at any point in time, and furthermore to act accordingly. 
In a very general way we can therefore conclude that certainly in civil law jurisdictions, and 
(at least) arguably in the common law environment, there is a general duty of the board of 
directors to respect the financial risk bearing ability of the company. This financial risk bear-
ing ability means that the company should only take on risks which it can bear based on its 
financial structure: that the necessary funds are at hand to execute the planned activities, and, 
in particular, the necessary liquidity is available to meet due obligations. The financial risk 
ability is related to the equity of the company. A company with a low equity may not have the 
risk bearing ability to conduct a specific business where there is a risk money may be lost. It 
is also worth noting that the structure of assets in a company with low equity is less flexible. 
As a general rule it can be said that the higher the risks taken, the greater the equity re-
quired.117 The board of directors is obliged to assess the risks of planned and effected opera-
tion (risk assessment) and act accordingly (risk management)118 and not permit the engaging 
in any business, if it is thought that the company lacks the financial resources to conduct such 
business.119 
117 Also see David Kershaw, ‘Involuntary Creditors and the Case of Accounting-based Distribution Regulation’ 
140 Journal of Business Law (2009) at p. 144; Davies, Worthington, Micheler (fn. 96) at 11-15; Lukas Glanz-
mann, ‘Die Pflicht zur angemessenen Kapitalausstattung der Aktiengesellschaft’, 1 Aktuelle Juristische Praxis 
(1997), pp. 51 et seq. at p. 52 et seq.; also supra 1.3.4 and 2.3. 
118 ‘Among the duties defined by the business judgment rule is the rule that no excessive risks can be taken.’ 
Gerd Krieger and Viola Sailer in Karsten Schmidt and Marcus Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz: Kommentar; [AktG] 
(Cologne, O Schmidt 2008) at p. 1061. 
119 ‘One of the fundamental obligations of the management board is to file a petition for the commencement of 
insolvency proceedings if the corporation becomes insolvent or in the event of overindebtedness, i.e. if the asset 
of the company no longer cover the liabilities.’ Frank Dornseifer, Corporate business forms in Europe: A com-
pendium of public and private limited companies in Europe (Staempfli, Bern 2005) at p. 252. Susanne Kalss, 
Nikolaus Adensamer, Janine Oelkers, ‘Director’s Duties in the Vincinity of Insolveny – a comparative analysis 
with reports from Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Spain and Sweden’ in Marcus Lutter (ed.), Legal Capital in Europe (Berlin, de Gruyter 2006) at p. 142: 
from the comparative analysis the conclusion is drawn that the duties that arise in these legislations in the vicini-
ty of insolvency ‘are measures that are designed to be taken before it is too late, i.e. before the company is insol-
vent.’ Hence, these duties also imply a duty to monitor the risk baring ability. 
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Both elements of this rule (risk profile and financial resources/equity120) are adjustable: if the 
equity is too low for aspired risk profile, either the equity or the risk profile has to be adjusted. 
For this reason, the rules regarding the financial risk bearing ability of the board are rules on 
equity.121 
4. Different legislative approaches to equity regulation in the financial and 
non-financial sectors, reasons 
4.1 Practical reasons; non-financial market sector is too heterogeneous 
 
The most important reason for different legislative approaches to equity regulation in the fi-
nancial and non-financial sectors is a practical reason: the non-financial sector is comparative-
ly much more complex. This statement may come as a surprise as bank balance sheets are 
“notoriously more opaque than those of generic firms”.122 In the case of banks the valuation 
of each asset is more difficult, e.g. the valuation of a credit requires the analysis of the respec-
tive creditor etc.123 So, a bank’s balance sheet is difficult to evaluate, but its easy to regulate, 
since we have a defined catalogue of asset categories. The opposite holds true in the real 
economy: Even if specific assets might be easier to value,124 the balance sheet structure of 
each company in the real economy is unique. It is not possible to define groups of specific 
companies and asset categories, and to then determine specific asset requirements and equity 
backing rules. 125 For private equity companies, trading companies, production companies, 
                                                 
120 To the interdependence of financial resources and equity, see supra 1.3.3. 
121 How these rules help to define the correct amount of equity, see supra 1.3.4, 6. 
122 Mülbert (fn. 27) at p. 420. 
123 Mülbert (fn. 27) at p. 420. 
124 In particular physical assets such as production plants, machinery, raw materials etc.  
125 Schön (fn. 2) at p. 437. 
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companies operating out of own or out of leased premises, companies which outsource certain 
functions and companies which do not, etc. different rules must apply. Both assets and liabili-
ties are too heterogeneous – ranging from fixed assets such as real estate and activated re-
search costs to current assets such as trade creditors with different credit rankings. The broad 
range of commercial activities in the real economy leads to countless risks which have to be 
assessed individually in view of the definition of provisions. In contrast, the balance sheets of 
different banks and different insurance companies are comparable and similarly structured, 
which makes it easier to define equity-related rules for specifically defined asset categories 
and the equivalent equity backing. This is simply not possible in the non-financial sector. 
 
The regulations on capital in the financial sector are rules which need to be enforced by gov-
ernmental financial market supervision.126 These rules need a regulator who supervises the 
market and who reacts quickly if rules are broken. A financial market type set of rules regard-
ing capital for the non-financial market sector would not only be much more complex due to 
the heterogeneity of the real economy but would be impossible to enforce unless society 
would be ready and willing to impose a financial market regulator to the rest of the economy. 
This is not an option. Therefore, we – firstly – can conclude, that the different legislative ap-
proach to equity or capital regulation in the financial and non-financial sector can be ex-
plained by practical reasons. A financial market-type equity regulation for the rest of the 
economy is unthinkable. 127 
4.2 Bank Failures damage the economy 
 
                                                 
126 Supra 2.4. 
127 Mülbert (fn. 27) at p. 436: ‘banking regulation … produces ever more regulation … to the lawyer’s full em-
ployment act, one may greatly doubt whether banks’ corporate governance should indeed map the way forward 
for corporate governance in general’. 
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It is said that the collapse of a bank causes larger collateral damage to the rest of the economy 
than the bankruptcy of an enterprise operating in the non-financial market. 128 In general 
terms, this increased importance of the financial sector, as it relates to the overall economy, is 
correct. The bankruptcy of a bank does cause more damage to the economy than the bank-
ruptcy of a production company or another non-financial market company of the same size.129 
Nevertheless, the recent past has shown, that there are also non-financial sector companies 
that are deemed by their governments as too big to fail130 – and which were consequently 
supported by the respective governments. The too big to fail argument therefore does not 
alone justify different equity regulation in the financial market.131 
5. How to regulate equity in the non-financial sector? 
5.1 Equity discussion focuses on the legal capital 
The academic discussion in Europe regarding equity largely concerns capital protection or 
distribution restrictions132 and whether minimal capital requirements should be made for the 
legal capital.133 The problem with this discussion is that it relates the concept of equity to 
128 Cf. Mülbert (fn. 27) at p. 420. 
129 Dysfunctional credit and money market pose a threat to the whole economy. Supra at fn. 40. 
130 Firms outside of the banking sector can be of systemic importance as well, and therefore, the systemic im-
portance criterion fails to explain why ‘banks should be subject to a unique legal regime’. Mülbert (fn. 27) at pp. 
434. 
131 Commission of Experts for limiting the economic risks posed by large companies (fn. 50) at p. 3. Also see 
Mülbert (fn. 27) at p. 434. 
132 John Armour, Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda, ‘Transactions with Creditors’, in Kraakman et al (eds.), The 
Anantomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach, 2nd edn. (Oxford University Press 2009) 
pp. 115 et seq. at p. 132. 
133 Siems, Herzog and Rosenhäger (fn. 65) at pp. 156 et seq.; Klaus J. Hopt, ‘The European Company Law Ac-
tion Plan Revisited: An Introduction’. Law Working Paper No. 140/2010, February 2010; available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1554662>, at p. 6; Fritz Ewang, ‘EU Minimum Capitalisation Requirement, An Anal-
ysis and Critique of the EU’s Minimum Capitalisation Requirement’, Charles Sturt University, 21 September 
2007, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015708>, at pp. 2 et seq.; Gordon Y. M . Chan, ‘Why does China 
not abolish the minimum capital requirement for limited liability companies?’, The Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442791>, at pp. 1 et seq.; Fleischer (fn. 94) at pp. 31 et seq. 
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rules on minimal capital requirements.134 It is indeed easy to attack the concept of equity un-
der this premise, since the formal rules regarding the minimal capital allow for grossly under-
capitalized companies, in which the formal capital- and creditor-protection rules just do not 
work. Statements such as ‘[l]egal capital rules are a form of primitive regulatory technolo-
gy’135 as they are linked to minimal non flexible capital requirements are the result of this 
shortcoming.136 On the other hand, we see the Rickford-concept, which works in a world of 
perfect accounting and perfectly adjustable creditors.137 It looks like a conflict between the 
Anglo-Saxon ideas of self-responsibility and the German virtues of cooperation.138 The dis-
cussion seems to have come to a halt; the term “battle line” when used to describe the current 
status of this discussion is to the point and illustrates the impasse: “In the legal capital discus-
sion, there are good points on both sides; … But if this is so, why should the member states be 
forced to use the same legal capital standard? If there is reasonable disagreement on the pros 
and cons, why should a country not be allowed to have its own way and experiment with 
it”.139 
5.2 “Real-economy”- analogous rules on the equity requirements in the finan-
cial sector  
 
The first question we have to look at is whether the rules on legal capital are analogous in 
their function to the quantitative and qualitative rules on equity in the financial sector.140 This 
is to be rejected as the legal-capital rules do not relate to the financial resources needed for a 
specific company. “Legal capital and the maintenance of capital have been falsely assumed to 
                                                 
134 Cf. Armour (fn. 4) at pp. 16 et seq. 
135 Armour (fn. 4) at p. 27. 
136 Paul Davies, ‘Directors’ Creditor-Regarding Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken in the Vicinity of 
Insolvency’, 7 EBOR (2006), pp. 301 et seq. at pp. 309 seq.; Armour (fn. 4) at p. 17; Armour, Hertig, Kanda (fn. 
132) at pp. 130 et seq.; Chan (fn. 133) at pp. 9 et seq. 
137 See supra 3.5. 
138 Fleischer (fn. 94) at p. 37 
139 Hopt (fn. 133) at p. 6.  
140 Supra at 2. 
 33 
be analogous to the function of the capital adequacy rules imposed to the banks and other fi-
nancial intermediaries.”141 The unique quality of the equity-rules for the financial sector is 
that they relate to the size and the risk-structure of the company,142 which is not the case with 
rules on legal capital. So, if the rules on the minimal legal-capital are not the “real-economy”- 
analogous to the equity requirements in the financial sector, which rules are? 
 
If we analyse the rules on capital requirements in the financial sector we can see that these 
rules apply a more general principle – that principle being that the determination of the quan-
titative and qualitative amount of equity should be based on the risks of asset valuation and 
the liquidity risks.143 Or, in other words, that the assets of a bank need to be of a quantity and 
a quality which would be sufficient to pay back the debts, in particular the deposits. Equity-
rules in the financial sector thus also address the amount and the quality of the assets held.144  
“Real-economy” rules, analogous to the equity requirements in the financial sector, should do 
the same: address the quantity and quality of the assets in view of the risk profile of the com-
pany.145 
 
The complexity and the heterogeneity of the assets held by companies of the real economy do 
not allow a direct analogy of financial sector type equity rules.146 This means that substantive 
rules on equity requirements for the real economy should be general, not specific. They 
should apply the principle that the assets of a company need to be of a quantity and a quality 
which would be sufficient to pay back the debts in consideration of the specific risk-profile of 
the company. Therefore the answer to the question of whether the rules on equity of the fi-
nancial sector can be applied in the real economy depends on the action taken: the answer is 
                                                 
141 Cf. Ewang (fn. 133) at p. 20. 
142 Mülbert (fn. 27) at p. 412; also see supra 2. 
143 Supra at 2.3. 
144 Supra at 2.2; See also Chan (fn. 133) at p. 16. 
145 Also see Mülbert (fn. 27) at pp. 413, 434. 
146 Armour (fn. 4) at p. 18 and supra at 4.1 
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yes if we reduce the rules to the general principle (relation between company risk and equity); 
but no, if we try to apply them directly. As a next step, the application of this principle of eq-
uity as a risk reserve to the real economy must be considered. 
5.3 Equity (Assets) and its relation to the risk-behaviour of a company 
Equity is the difference-amount between the debts and the assets of the company. It includes 
not only the legal capital of the company but also the legal and the accounting reserves, the 
hidden reserves147 and the accrued profits and the free reserves which can be distributed to 
shareholders.148 Therefore the quality of the equity is also defined by the quality of the assets 
held. Further, there is a link between the quantity and the quality of the assets and the risk-
bearing ability of the company. The risk-behaviour has the potential to reduce the assets; if 
the venture in which the assets were invested fails, more assets are needed to allow the com-
pany to fulfill its obligations.  
The relation between the assets of a company and its risk-bearing ability is widely acknowl-
edged: “[T]he amount necessary to capitalise a business adequately so as to internalise the 
risks of hazardous activities will depend on the nature of the business.”149 “[A] method of 
protecting creditors can consist in ensuring that a company operates only with an appropriate 
level of assets, so as to increase the chances that it will be able to meet the claims of its 
creditors.”150 An increase in the risk-exposure of a company downgrades the value of its 
147 Supra at 1.2.2. 
148 Supra at 1. 
149 Armour (fn.4) at p. 19. 
150 Davies, Worthington, Micheler (fn.96) at 11-1; also supra at 5. 
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debts151 because this leads to an increase in default risk. “In theory, such rules [on legal 
capital] could reinforce the credibility of legal capital as a financial cushion for creditors by 
acting as capital adequacy provisions similar to those governing financial institutions.”152 
Consequently, companies are only permitted to make payments to shareholders out of funds 
that are not needed to satisfy the claims of creditors.153 To safeguard the assets of the compa-
ny is an efficient way of creditor-protection.154 
5.4 Self-regulated or binding rules on equity 
 
It is argued, that it is up to the private sector to regulate its risks and to act accordingly and 
that it is not the concern of governments to control equity in the non-financial sector – there is 
no respective public interest and private creditors should take responsibility.155 For this reason 
there is no justification for strict financial-market type equity rules. But even those who plead 
for self-responsibility accept a liability of directors if these violate rules regarding the protec-
tion of creditors in the vicinity of a bankruptcy.156 The absence of a state regulatory enforce-
ment system on equity does not mean the absence of rules. 
5.5 Equity rules in connection with the duty of directors 
 
                                                 
151 Mülbert (fn. 27) at p. 13: ‘With respect to the shareholders, the lack of personal liability of the corporation’s 
debts (limited liability) will serve as a powerful incentive to cause the company to act opportunistically, either in 
the form of a subsequent distribution of assets to its shareholders or by taking on riskier business projects, i.e. 
projects with more volatile earnings prospects’. 
152 Armour, Hertig, Kanda (fn. 132) at p. 133. 
153 Eva Micheler, ‘Disguised Returns of Capital – An Arm’s Length Approach’, 69 Cambridge Law Journal 
2010, pp. 151 et seq. at p. 184; Braid (fn. 110) at p. 200; Wagner (fn. 109) at p. 227: ‘The protective function 
aims at avoiding the externalisation of risk to the detriment of outside creditors. One important element of this 
function is to prohibit the distribution of such assets of the limited liability company which are necessary to 
cover the claims of outside creditors’. 
154 Siems, Herzog, Rosenhäger (fn. 65) at p. 152. 
155 Rickford Report (fn. 2) at p. 967; Mülbert (fn. 27) at p. 422: Banks are different in regard to their systemic 
risk and in regard to their vulnerability to bank runs. See also supra at 4.2. 
156 Supra at 3.7. 
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Further, discussions in the literature on the relation between the equity and the risk-behavior 
of a company also concern the rules regarding the duties of the board of directors.157 These 
rules relate the risk bearing ability of the company (also) to the financial risk bearing ability, 
and thus to the equity of the company: “As far as strategic business decisions are concerned, 
therefore, creditors are de facto protected by the directors’ shareholder-regarding duties, so 
long as the company has significant shareholder funds.”158 Davies, in particular, emphasizes 
this relation when he relates the duties of the board of directors to the equity of the company, 
by saying that rules on the duties of directors in the vicinity of a bankruptcy may reduce 
shareholders incentives to incorporate with inadequate capital, even if the formal legal capital 
requirements are met.159 “Among the duties defined by the business judgment rule is the rule 
that no excessive risks can be taken.”160 “The duty requires directors, at a time when the com-
pany is in some form of financial distress, to take account the interests of the company’s cred-
itors.”161  
These quotes show that there is a legally relevant relation between the financial risk bearing 
ability and the equity of the company162: Be it as a general duty of directors163 or as a specific 
duty of directors towards creditors in the vicinity of insolvency164, under both systems direc-
tors are obliged to monitor the risk bearing ability of the company and to act accordingly.  In 
a next step this principle has to be applied to define a set of rules regarding the equity re-
quirements in the real economy. 
157 Supra at 3.7. 
158 Davies (fn. 136) at p. 304. 
159 Davies (fn. 136) at p. 310. 
160 Krieger, Sailer (fn. 118) at p. 1061. 
161 Andrew Keay, ‘Directors’s Duties to Creditors: Contractiarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over-
Protection of Creditors’, 5 Modern Law Review (2003), pp. 665 et seq. at p. 668. 
162 Supra at 3.7. 
163 In civil law under the premise of stakeholdersim, under common law arguably under an ‘enlightened share-
holderism’.  Supra at 3.7; also see Keay (fn. 101) at pp. 2 et seq. 
164 Under fraudulent transfer law. Supra at 3.7. 
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6. Rules on equity for the real economy 
6.1 Relationship between risk bearing ability and equity, risk assessment 
 
It has been shown that due to the heterogeneity of the real economy specific rules for asset-
backing by the nature of each individual asset are not practicable. 165  Additionally, non-
flexible static rules on capital only produce results during the formation of the company 
phase. Such static rules represent an entry-barrier or a proof for the seriousness of the entre-
preneurs 166, but fail to set equity requirements related to the risk bearing ability of the com-
pany. It follows therefore, that what amounts of adequate equity is to be determined by refer-
ence to the aspired risk profile of the company.167  
 
The board of directors is required to conduct a risk assessment when following the ISA 315168 
rules, but such a requirement can also be based on general rules regarding the duties of the 
board of directors.169 This risk assessment is particularly significant as it not only defines the 
risks but also values them. As a consequence risk assessments should address the probability 
and the effect of each risk and define a figure which qualifies the consolidated risk: for func-
tional risk management the board or the management must identify business risks, estimate 
                                                 
165 Supra at 5.2. 
166 Armour, Hertig, Kanda (fn. 132) at p. 131. 
167 Handschin (fn. 12) at pp. 200 et seq. 
168 ISA 315 <http://web.ifac.org/clarity-center/isa-315>. 
169 Keay (fn. 161) at pp. 683, 699, 686: ‘directors must be informed so that they can ensure that their company is 
not engaging in wrongful trading’. Also see supra 3.7. 
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the significance of these risks, asses the likelihood of their occurrence and decide on action to 
address those risk.170 
6.2 Accounting-rules relevant risks: reserves, depreciation, provisions 
The risk assessment may reveal risks which may then require direct revaluations, the impair-
ment of assets and the formation of reserves and provisions based on applicable accounting 
rules. For example, if the management realizes that the risk factor in a DCF valued asset no 
longer depicts the risks properly, the risk factor would have to be increased which would in 
turn lead to a devaluation of that asset.171 This reduces the nominal equity. Often the revalua-
tion due to its lower valuation also reduces the revaluation risk. Ideally the reduction of the 
book value and the reduction of the valuation risk are parallel. If the accounting rules allow, 
the devaluation could go beyond the present value, thus creating hidden reserves.172 Some of 
the risks addressed in the risk assessment concern risks deriving from past events which may 
lead to future liabilities. IAS 37.10 defines a ‘provision’173 as a liability of uncertain timing or 
uncertain amount. Such provisions must be made if the obligation has arisen due to a past 
event, if the probability of payment is more than 50 per cent and the amount can be estimated 
170 Also cf. ISA 315.15 a-c. ‘If the entity has established such a process (referred to hereafter as the “entity’s risk 
assessment process”), the auditor shall obtain an understanding of it, and the results thereof. If the auditor identi-
fies risks of material misstatement that management failed to identify, the auditor shall evaluate whether there 
was an underlying risk of a kind that the auditor expects would have been identified by the entity’s risk assess-
ment process. If there is such a risk, the auditor shall obtain an understanding of why that process failed to iden-
tify it, and evaluate whether the process is appropriate to its circumstances or determine if there is a significant 
deficiency in internal control with regard to the entity’s risk assessment process.’ (ISA 315.16)‘If the entity has 
not established such a process or has an ad hoc process, the auditor shall discuss with management whether 
business risks relevant to financial reporting objectives have been identified and how they have been addressed. 
The auditor shall evaluate whether the absence of a documented risk assessment process is appropriate in the 
circumstances, or determine whether it represents a significant deficiency in internal control.’ (ISA 315.17). 
171 Arnold (fn. 1) at pp. 114 et seq.: however, ‘[t]he risk-adjusted discount rate method relies on an accurate 
assessment of the riskiness of a project. Risk perception and judgment are bound to be, to some extent, subjec-
tive and susceptible to personal bias.’ 
172 Supra 1.2.2. 
173 E.g. Switzerland: OR Arts. 675 (2) and 671; Germany: AktG §§ 58 (4), 150, German Commercial Code 
[Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB] § 272 (2). IAS 37.14: ‘A provision shall be recognized when: (a) an enterprise has a 
present obligation (legal or constructive) as a result of a past event (45); (b) it is probable that an outflow of 
resources embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation; and (c) a reliable estimate can 
be made of the amount of the obligation. If these conditions are not met, no provision should be recognized.’ 
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reliably.174 Provisions for one-off events (e.g. a law suit) are measured at the most likely 
amount,175 provisions for large populations of events (e.g. warranties) are measured at a prob-
ability-weighted expected value176.  
6.3 Revaluation surpluses combine true and fair accounting and the prudence 
principle? 
 
Many accounting rules and the Fourth European Company Law Directive for private compa-
nies177 require the creation of a specific revaluation surplus as additional (first tier) equity 
whenever assets are valued above their purchase price or production costs.178 Consequently 
the revaluation of the asset does not increase the distributable profit.179 The revaluation sur-
plus has the same function as hidden reserves. The creation of revaluation surplus increases 
first-tier equity and leaves the accrued profit unchanged. A revaluation surplus can only be 
dissolved if the respective assets are devalued or sold. If high revaluation surpluses lead to 
first-tier equity exceeding the equity-requirements, the dissolution of the revaluation reserve 
is not possible, but the statutory capital can be decreased following the respective rules. The 
revaluation surplus can be a very powerful tool to combine transparency-driven true and fair 
accounting rules with the requirements of the prudence principle and the maintenance of the 
company’s equity. The scepticism regarding true and fair accounting in the aftermath of the 
2008 crisis180 can be addressed if true and fair valuations would, as a rule, be combined with 
the creation of revaluation reserves. This would show the true and fair value of the assets cor-
rectly, but would also prevent the distribution of profits which are a result of such revalua-
                                                 
174 IAS 37.14. 
175 IAS 37.40. 
176 IAS 37.39. 
177 Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC, Art. 33 (2). 
178 Supra fn. 2.1. Admissible deviation from the purchase and production price valuation method set forth in Art. 
32 of the Fourth Company Law Directive. 
179 More liabilities means less distributable profit. Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC, Art. 33 (2) (a). 
180 Cf. Santella, Turrini (fn. 82) at pp. 440 et seq.  
 40 
tions. Legislative reaction to the 2008/09 crises should consider developing this concept fur-
ther. 
 
6.4 Further risks which are not controlled by accounting rules 
 
Other risks which cannot be controlled by accounting rules181 have to be controlled by equity. 
The procedure to define the equity is a combination of risk assessment and the application of 
accounting rules. Financial risks which do not lead to accounting consequences, such as 
changed valuations or additional reserves, show the necessity of additional equity. For exam-
ple, if the valuation of an asset or liability is uncertain, it can either be impaired, or additional 
equity to control the impairment risk has to be created. Whether the one (impairment) or the 
other (additional equity) is required depends on whether accounting rules cover all revaluation 
risks. Often valuation risks are covered by both accounting rules and equity, but with different 
thresholds. For example the threshold to impair assets is not the same as the observable 
threshold when defining the equity to cover the asset valuation risks. A 20 per cent chance 
that an asset with a nominal value of 2,000 has in fact a value of 1,000 may not necessitate a 
revaluation, but may create the need for additional equity.182 Therefore the risk assessment 
serves two functions: to adjust the nominal equity based on applicable accounting rules; and, 
secondly, to define the necessary equity to close the gap between the risks covered by ac-
counting rules and the ‘real risks’. 
                                                 
181 Cf. Jonathan Rickford, ‘Legal Approaches to Restriction Distributions to Shareholders: Balance Sheet Tests 
and Solvency Tests’, 7 EBOR (2006) at p. 172. 
182 Supra 1.3.2. 
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6.5 Corporate Governance rules and the determination of equity, role of the 
shareholder 
Equity can be defined as the shareholders stake in the company.183 Equity comprises the funds 
which the principal entrusted to the agent.184 It is the shareholder’s decision as to how much 
equity it wants to entrust to the company. This means that the shareholder has the competence 
to define the two factors which relate directly to equity: first, the amount and structure of the 
equity itself; and second, the risk bearing profile of the company. This separation of power 
between the shareholders (in the assembly of shareholders) and the board can also be derived 
from the more general principal agent rule: the principal gives funds to the agent and defines 
the risk behaviour related to the management of these funds. Outside of corporate law, this 
division of power between principal and agent is undisputed (e.g. it is up to the bank-
customer to define the risk profile of its financial investment). 
For these reasons it is the shareholders who are the competent body within the company to 
define the equity and risk profile. They act either in reaction to motions of the board (regard-
ing capital increases and decreases; distribution of dividends) or as founders of the company. 
If the shareholders refuse to agree to the equity which the board needs in order to take the 
aspired risks, they are also, effectively, taking a decision regarding the (reduced) risk bearing 
ability of the company. As a consequence of this decision the company will not have the risk 
bearing ability needed to execute the aspired business. The board is therefore forced to adjust 
its risk profile or behaviour to the company’s risk bearing ability. The competence of the 
183 Supra at fn. 3 and fn. 4. 
184 For the concept within corporate law: Davies, Worthington, Micheler (fn. 96) at 7-1 et seq.: ‘More complicat-
ed principal-agent problems arise when not only is the principal unable to monitor the agent, but also the agent 
possesses information about his environment  … which the principal does not.’ Sanford J. Grossmann, Oliver D. 
Hart, ‘An Analysis of the Principal Agent-Problem’, 51 Econometrica (1983) at p. 43. Further, a capital regime 
as proposed by the Rickford Report might inflict with the right of shareholders to approve reductions of capital. 
Micheler (fn. 82) at p. 426. 
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shareholders to define the amount of equity means as a result that the shareholders are also 
competent to define the risk profile of the company – the two elements, equity and risk bear-
ing ability, behave synchronously and are two sides of the same coin. 
 
6.6 Distribution restrictions: Legal capital or other equity? 
 
The protection of the legal capital and reserves (first-tier equity) is stronger than the protec-
tion of the second-tier equity.185 Legal reserves cannot be paid back to shareholders; the rules 
regarding the repayment of legal capital to shareholders are more formalized and require a 
specific procedure to ensure that the claims of the creditors remain covered by assets.186 The 
equity protection of the second-tier equity (accrued profits and free reserves) is less formal-
ized. In certain situations (even in civil law countries, for example through the purchase of 
own shares187) equity can be distributed to the shareholders without the necessity of a share-
holder-resolution.188 This raises the question, whether the equity requirements which derive 
from the risk assessment should be satisfied through first-tier equity such as legal capital or 
through equity in a broader sense, including first- and second-tier equity.189 
 
In the interests of the creditor and the financial stability of the company, the creation of first-
tier equity seems to be favoured. First-tier equity relies on formalized figures and not so much 
                                                 
185 Surpa at 1.1. 
186 Also the preamble of the Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC states: ‘Whereas Community provisions 
should be adopted for maintaining the capital, which constitutes the creditors’ security, in particular by prohibit-
ing any reduction thereof by distribution to shareholders where the latter are not entitled to it and by imposing 
limits on the company's right to acquire its own shares’. 
187 See the amendments to the Second Council  Directive 77/91/EEC set forth in Directive 2006/68/EC, (4): 
‘Public limited liability companies should be allowed to acquire their own shares up to the limit of the compa-
ny’s distributable reserves’. Second Council Directive 77/99/EEC Art. 19 (1) (c). 
188 According to Second Company Law Directive 77/99/EEC Art. 19 (2) ‘where the acquisition of a company's 
own shares is necessary to prevent serious and imminent harm to the company’. See also New Zealand Compa-
nies Act 1993, Section 52 (1), which allows the board to authorize distributions if the liquidity test permits so. 
189 Handschin (fn. 12) at pp. 208 et seq. 
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on the discretion of the board. Further, the reduction of first-tier equity requires a resolution 
of the shareholders and, in most pieces of legislation, a special audit report.190 On the other 
hand, as long as the funds remain in the company and are not distributed to shareholders, it 
does not matter whether the accrued profits are high and the legal capital is low or the other 
way round.191 To require the creation of first-tier equity only to cover all company risks 
would certainly reduce the flexibility of the board in the structuring the financing of the com-
pany. If the board would be required to create first-tier equity (e.g. legal capital) in the amount 
of the necessary risk-reserve, a default in complying with the rule would lead to a breach of 
duty by the board, even though there was only hypothetical damage. The time gap between 
the breach of duty and the occurrence of the damage can be lengthy, leading to the risk of a 
claim being time-barred, as well as making it difficult to provide evidence for the causality 
between the breach of duty and the damage.192 Accordingly, the risk-based equity require-
ments can correctly be satisfied by both first- and second-tier equity equally. For creditors, the 
additional value of legal rules which would require the company to create first-tier equity 
based on the risk profile of the company is not sufficiently significant to compensate for the 
disadvantages of such a rule. Therefore the decision to form its risk-reserve with first or sec-
ond tier capital should be left to the company. 
6.7 Duties of the Board of Directors: to align equity and risk behavior 
 
                                                 
190 However, the Second Company Law Directive leaves it to the Member States to determine which reserves are 
distributable. For the requirement of auditing, Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC, Art. 51 (1) (a): ‘Companies 
must have their annual account audited by one or more persons authorized by national law to audit accounts. (b) 
The person or persons responsible for auditing the accounts must also verify that the annual report is consistent 
with the annual accounts for the same financial year.’ 
191 Handschin (fn. 12) at p. 209. 
192 Handschin (fn. 12) at p. 209. 
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There is a general duty of the board of directors to respect the financial risk bearing ability of 
the company.193 Therefore, the management and the board have to understand the valuation 
rules which have been applied,194 and that the valuation of the assets depends on the assumed 
future prospects. As a general rule it can be said that the equity must be higher the more risks 
a company is taking.195 It can only allow the business to proceed when the company has the 
financial resources to conduct such business. The board has to analyse the structure of the 
assets and determine whether the valuations are still correct considering new technical devel-
opments, changed market requirements and conditions, or financially unstable debtors who 
necessitate reserves for their possible bankruptcy. In as far as future cash and other income 
potentials are part of a true and fair valuation, the board and management have to assess if 
these assumptions regarding the future prospects are still accurate or if they have to be adjust-
ed. 
Further, financial control means that the board of directors and the management have to con-
trol the liquidity risk of the company. Similar to the banking sector,196 a solvency-test can be 
used to verify the correctness of the real equity. Such an additional test can be especially help-
ful to the transparency of off-balance sheet risks, in particular the liquidity risk, and thus help 
to define the level of equity.197 In this sense solvency-testing should not be used as a single 
regime in combination with a balance-sheet test to provide for creditor protection, but should 
rather be considered as an instrument to help to determine the adequate corporate equity in 
193 Supra at 3.7 and 5. 
194 Böckli (fn. 11) at pp. 1545 and 1619; Holger Fleischer in Gerald Spindler and Eberhard Stilz (eds.), Kom-
mentar zum Aktiengesetz (Munich, CH Beck 2007) at p. 906. 
195 See supra at 1.3.4, 2.3 and 5. 
196 Supra at 2.2. 
197 Rickford Report (fn. 2) at p. 974 fn. 191: ‘[For a solvency-test] even a short term asset surplus requirement is 
too rigid for a company which is able to borrow.’ A company is solvent when it holds sufficient high quality 
equity that can be turned into liquidity at any given time without suffering inadequate losses and can actually do 
so without exceeding its risk baring ability. 
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relation to the company’s risk structure. Thus the ‘solvency test’198 is not solely relied upon 
but rather forms part of a greater consolidated assessment process used to define the equity 
requirements of the company. 
 
If the board realises that the equity is insufficient in relation to the risk profile, or aspired risk 
ability of the company, it has to try to bring the ‘equity’ and ‘risk profile’ in line.199 This can 
be done in two ways: first, by trying to convince shareholders to increase the equity; or (if the 
shareholders refuse to increase equity) second, to change the risk profile of the company. In 
its motion to the shareholders regarding dividends, the board of directors may not propose a 
dividend which would reduce the equity to a level which is too low. The board has to assess, 
if sufficient equity will remain after the distribution of the dividend based on the risk bearing 
ability of the company. If the shareholders decide on dividends which go beyond the motion 
of the board or if they refuse to an increase of the capital, they are also effectively deciding on 
the risk profile of the company, and the board has to change the risk behaviour. Similarly a 
decision by the shareholders to reduce the equity can also be a decision to change the risk 
profile of the company when the reduced equity is then insufficient to continue with the pre-
vious risk policy. 
6.8 Role of the auditor: to testify that remaining equity is sufficient?  
 
                                                 
198 Cf. supra at 3.4.; however, the solvency test should be applied as an additional tool to adjust equity to an 
adequate level, like a simple version of the Basel III liquidity test. See supra text to fn. 58 et seq. 
199 ISA 1.25-26 requires the management to assess the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. ISA 570.3-
7: ‘detailed requirements regarding management’s responsibility to assess the entity’s ability to continue as a 
going concern and related financial statement disclosures may also be set out in law or regulation’ (ISA 570.1). 
‘In other financial reporting frameworks, there may be no explicit requirement for management to make a specif-
ic assessment of the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. Nevertheless, since the going concern as-
sumption is a fundamental principle in the preparation of financial statements as discussed in paragraph 2, the 
preparation of the financial statements requires management to assess the entity’s ability to continue as a going 
concern even if the financial reporting framework does not include an explicit requirement to do so’ (ISA 570.4). 
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All risks covered by accounting rules200 are relevant not only the board of directors but also 
the auditor; where the company is obliged to have its books audited. The auditor has to state 
whether the valuation of assets and liabilities is correct.201 Further, the auditor has to assess 
the going concern ability of the company.202 As noted above the going concern ability means 
that the entity is able to continue its business for the foreseeable future.203 In some legislation 
this period is defined to be a period of one year after the balance sheet day.204 Consequently 
the auditor has to assess the liquidity risk of the company and determine if there is sufficient 
equity to bear that risk. Further, the auditor has to assess potential valuation risks, even if 
these valuation risks do not require a revaluation in the books. 
 
According to Art. 728a of the Swiss Code of Obligations, the auditor not only examines 
whether the annual accounts comply with the law and the articles of association, but also 
whether “the motion made by the board of directors to the general meeting on the allocation 
of the balance sheet profit complies with the statutory provisions and the articles of associa-
tion” (para. 2). This additional test goes beyond a formal check of whether or not the amount 
of the dividend proposal exceeds the accrued profits. If, for example, the board plans to dis-
tribute all liquid assets to the shareholders, the auditor cannot testify to compliance even if the 
amount of the proposed dividend is lower than the accrued profits.205 Equally, it can be ques-
tioned whether the auditor or, if there is no auditor, the management or the board, could be 
                                                 
200 Supra at 6.3. 
201 Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC, Art. 51 (1) (a): Companies (listed under Art. 1) must have their annual 
accounts audited. Also see Armour, Hertig, Kanda (fn. 132) at pp. 128 et seq. 
202 ISA 570.6, 7. However, there are limitations on the auditor’s ability to detect misstatements in regard to fu-
ture events that may endanger an entity’s going concern ability, and therefore, the ‘auditor’s report cannot be 
viewed as a guarantee as to the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern’ (ISA 570.7). 
203 ISA 570.2. 
204 ‘Going concern ability’ ISA 570.2. 
205 See also ISA, 570.6: ‘The auditor’s responsibility is to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence about the 
appropriateness of management’s use of the going concern assumption in the preparation of the financial state-
ments and to conclude whether there is a material uncertainty about the entity’s ability to continue as a going 
concern.’ 
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required to testify206 that the equity which remains after the proposed dividend payment is 
still sufficient in view of the company’s risk profile. Such an additional test has the potential 
to replace formal minimal-capital and formal capital protection rules.207 
6.9 Enforcement of the rules on equity for the real economy 
The sanction system for the non-compliance with equity requirements for the non-financial 
sector must take into account that the rules are more general, that a financial market type 
regulatory sanction system would be too complex and that the smaller impact of a company’s 
failure to the general economy justifies a less extensive sanction system. The argument that 
there is no public interest in a system to control the equity of companies of the non-financial 
market sector208 is correct. But the absence of a state regulatory enforcement system does not 
mean the absence of rules. As is the case with many other sectors, a sanction system has to be 
applied by private initiative. The same should apply if general rules on equity are violated. 
The sanction system is a combination of liability and corporate governance rules with the pos-
sibility to litigate if somebody, for example a creditor in case of a bankruptcy suffers damage 
by the violation of rules. 
In most jurisdictions liability rules are already in place if the company causes damage by pur-
suing excessive risks209. These management liability rules regulate not only the liability-
consequences of a specific risk behaviour but also the aspired risk behaviour/profile and equi-
ty. In this sense they also define equity requirements for the non-financial sector. The norms 
are less precise as this is the case with the equity requirements for banks and for insurance 
206 See Rickford Report (fn. 2) at pp. 974 seq.; also see Rüdiger Veil, ‘The regime of the Capital Directive versus 
Alternative Systems’, in Marcus Lutter (ed.), Legal Capital in Europe (Berlin, de Gruyter 2006), at pp. 84 et 
seq.; for the director’s certificate see Section 52 (2) of the New Zealand Companies Act 1993. 
207 See supra at fn. 5. 
208 Supra at 5.4. 
209 Supra at 3.6 and 6.8. 
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companies but also more flexible and in particular they consider the various and heterogene-
ous situations in the real economy. They are not executed through regulatory execution by a 
public office but, indirectly, through the liability of the board who violates the equity-driven 
risk baring ability of its company. 
7. Conclusion: flexible rules on equity are to be preferred to strict rules on 
legal capital 
 
It has been shown that the rules regarding the quantitative and qualitative capital-requirements 
for the financial sector cannot be simply transferred to the real economy. Financial market 
type capital regulation is not possible due to the heterogeneity of the real economy, and fur-
thermore because there is no public interest in a financial-market type regulatory system. At 
last, one has to admit, that in the real economy formal rules on legal capital cannot 
compensate for financial market type capital regulation, because they do neither relate to the 
size nor to the risk-structure of the company.210 They – at best – serve as an entry-barrier but 
cannot prevent grossly undercapitalized companies and thus damage to the creditors.  
 
Yet as long as the funds remain in the company and are not distributed to shareholders, it does 
not matter whether the accrued profits are high and the legal capital is low or the other way 
round.211 In both the financial sector and the real economy the important thing is equity, not 
so much the legal capital. For this reason, what is needed are not formal rules on legal capital, 
but flexible and self dependent rules on equity. If (only) the principles of capital regulation for 
the financial market are applied (and not the regulatory transformation) we come to rules 
which require equity levels to be set according to the risk profile of the company and the di-
                                                 
210 Supra at 5.1. 
211 Supra at 6.6 
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rectors to act accordingly. Solvency- and balance-sheet-testing are important tools to monitor 
the adequate level of equity. In order to formalize these tools, it could be worthwhile to dis-
cuss whether the management or auditor could be required to testify that the equity which 
remains after the proposed dividend payment is still sufficient in view of the company’s risk 
profile.212  
212 Supra at 6.8. 
